

Cordier, Hammarskjold and the Congo

Cordier had a blind admiration for Dag Hammarskjold from the day he entered the organization as Secretary-General in April 1953. On the surface these two men would appear to be very different but as the years have passed I have come to think that perhaps they did after all have some basic similarities in their general philosophy of life.

By appearance, polish and personality Hammarskjold was the man more obviously gifted in the accepted sense -- the patrician from the distinguished Swedish family, the gourmet, the man of art, the linguist, the writer, the brilliant economic and legal mind. The descendent of a long line of outstanding public servants and churchmen of Lutheran persuasion, he had entered government service in Sweden soon after completing his formal education.

Andy Cordier regarded him with the highest esteem. To him Dag was the renaissance man of his time. He was completely fascinated with his wide range of interests and delighted to have this man at the head of the organization. As time went on he seemed to emulate him in certain little respects and one was in his smoking habits. Dag smoked cigarillos constantly and it was not long before

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Andy had adopted the same practice and there was always a box of cigarillos on hand in his office. Actually it was a good switch for he seemed to enjoy these more than the cigarettes. There was a reverse process going on too. In introducing Dag to the running of the Secretary-General's office and to the operation of the Secretariat in those first months it seemed to me that much of Andy's casual, mid-American "farmer" style rubbed off on Dag. For soon he too became very informal, called everyone by their first names and went around in his shirt sleeves smoking the famous cigarillos. Ralph Bunche came to the 38th floor a year later in his new post. He too was casual and informal in manner. Dag seemed to feel most at home with these two Americans.

Not only did Cordier admire Dag's universal qualities but as time went on his respect for his leadership, brilliance, innovativeness and judgment deepened and neither time nor events could change this. He had the deepest respect for Dag's integrity and his purely international and juridical approach. Cordier was not alone in this dedication to Hammarskjold for Dag seemed to inspire all those closely associated with him in the same way. Each wished to be considered as the closest associate and confidante of this brilliant man and it seemed to me that the resulting situation was an unspoken competition as to who would hold first place in his esteem and affection.

This was a tribute to Dag, of course, both as a person and as a brilliant, successful figure but as an observer it was a situation which made me not a little uncomfortable.

By virtue of his own role and his constant daily contacts with them Cordier came to know both Lie and Hammarskjold well. However in the case of Hammarskjold they became friends as well as colleagues. Whenever Dag did not have an official luncheon engagement he and Cordier usually lunched together, more often than not in the Delegates' Dining Room, but sometimes Dag, Cordier and other colleagues would go off to lunch outside the building. Hammarskjold, who was unmarried, frequently entertained his close associates in the Secretariat at dinner in his home and everyone was pleased when they were invited to these dinners. They were considered delightful affairs with excellent food and scintillating conversation generated by Hammarskjold. Cordier was in constant communication with Hammarskjold and the latter kept him informed on all important developments. Consequently Andy felt that he had actually developed a closer, more stable working relationship with Dag than he had had with Trygve Lie. In his view this enabled him to carry on his work more effectively because he came to know Hammarskjold's way of thinking and he could therefore more accurately convey to his fellow colleagues, both in the Secretariat and the Delegations, what the Secretary-General had in mind.

For Dag's part, my impression was that he was glad to have an "Andy" there when he arrived and developed a deep affection for him. Doubtless he learned a great deal through him about the behind-the-scenes operation of the General Assembly and the administration of the Secretariat and he came to appreciate Cordier's quick perceptiveness, his unerring interpretation of the political nuances and his ability to convey these to Delegations when called upon to do so on Hammarskjold's behalf. However I used to wonder if he really ever sorted out Cordier in his mind for the man he really was. I doubt if he was fully aware of Cordier's integrity and deep pride in himself or his impact and reputation in international circles, or for that matter if he or Lie had the opportunity to become aware of the leadership qualities which made Cordier so impressive to others. Actually it is possible that neither Lie nor Hammarskjold were able to truly assess Cordier because he was their subordinate. In a sense their vision could have been as obscured as mine but for the reverse reason. I do not think Dag ever completely understood Cordier's type of person -- seemingly plain, unsophisticated in life style and certainly not like the usual diplomatic personality. Andy's presence was probably taken for granted for he was always there, always available.

Furthermore from where I sat it appeared that Dag unconsciously took on much of Cordier's role in the General Assembly as the years went by, and even gradually his central administrative role, for Dag

was a man who appeared to want to be in complete charge, and to know all the answers, and he had great vitality, drive and curiosity. I am certain that if Andrew Cordier were alive he would dispute this theory with me because he often remarked that he had enjoyed more real responsibility under Hammarskjold than under his predecessor. But every once in a while I would get the eerie feeling that Dag had arrived at a stage where he felt that he really did not need an "Andy", that no one was indispensable and that he could carry everything himself -- and better than anyone else. In his own way therefore he was gradually neutralizing Cordier, but I would not say intentionally so. On the other hand it seemed as if Cordier was so confident in his working relationship with Hammarskjold and so caught up in his admiration of Dag's expertise and universal excellence that he did not see what was happening to himself.


This is the way things appeared to me when in July 1960 a major crisis developed in the Belgian Congo, one week after it had attained independence. The Belgian Congo was to become the major problem of the United Nations for the next four years and was to have lasting and even tragic effects not only on the organization but on the lives and careers of both Hammarskjold and Cordier. In the following paragraphs I shall not attempt to go into all the complexities of the Congo story, nor to deal with the historical role which was played by the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, but will treat only such events as they involved and affected Andrew Cordier, for he let us remember is the central figure of this narrative.

The crisis was first ignited by a mutiny amongst the soldiers of the "Force Publique" (or national army) against their Belgian officers. There had been growing resentment against the Belgians. The Congolese soldiers were seeking better conditions of service from the new government and they were dissatisfied that there had not been immediate Africanization of the officer corps. Due to the paternalistic nature of the colonial rule, Belgians had remained on in the Army and elsewhere. At the time of independence some 10,000 Belgian civil servants were still holding nearly all the responsible positions in the public service. The Congolese army had 1,000 officers, all of whom were Belgian, while the 24,000 "other ranks" were Congolese. Under independence arrangements the Belgian officers were to continue on until such time as Congolese had been trained and commissioned to replace them. Belgian metropolitan troops remained on at Kamina and Kitona, the two great military bases. Further contributing to the imbalance in the social structure was the fact that the economy of the country -- mining, industry and agriculture -- was virtually all in the hands of Western European corporations.

Within a few days the officers had lost control and the mutiny had grown into a violent outburst against all Belgians in the Congo. A whirlwind of insurrection was sweeping the country. There was a consequent breakdown of law and order and Belgian civilians began leaving in great numbers, their expertise disappearing with them.

Concerned with the welfare of the white population the Belgian Government offered to provide military assistance to restore law and order, an unwelcome suggestion to the new Congolese government. Despite this, Belgian airborne troops were brought from Kamina to intervene in the two cities of Luluabourg and Elizabethville (in the province of Katanga) to protect the white population. In addition Belgian metropolitan troops were flown in from Europe without the agreement of the Central Government and in violation of Treaty commitments. These initiatives greatly exacerbated the situation, producing more bloodshed and a further exodus of Belgian civilians.

Other political developments of a serious nature were to follow. One was the declared secession of the wealthy province of Katanga under Moise Tshombe. Contrary



to what was happening with the Central Government in Leopoldville, Tshombe welcomed the return of the Belgian military.

In July, in response to an urgent appeal to the United Nations from President Kasavubu of the Congo and its Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, a United Nations peacekeeping force was introduced into that country under a Security Council resolution . At the same time the Security Council called for the withdrawal of the Belgian military. Tshombe, who was at odds with the Central Government , initially rejected the idea of the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Katanga and it was only later in response to another resolution of the Security Council and to initiatives taken by Hammarskjold, that he agreed to their deployment in that province.

Throughout July and August of 1960 Cordier was working closely with Hammarskjold at the New York end on all aspects of the Congo operation, including the establishment of the United Nations force there. During this period Ralph Bunche was serving in the Congo as the Secretary-General's representative, having gone there initially for the Independence Day ceremonies on 30 June, but also with the intention of remaining on for a period to engage in consultations with the new Government concerning a proposed United Nations technical assistance program. The unexpected political developments had made it necessary for him to continue on as the Secretary-General's representative in a new context, although it did not appear to be the intention that he would remain there indefinitely in this role.

By early August Bunche had begun to suffer misgivings about the length of his stay and sent a personal letter to Cordier asking him to raise the question of his return with the Secretary-General. In his letter he cited exasperation with the Congolese, his difficulties in dealing with them, his inadequate French and his need to return to New York for family reasons by the end of August. In a follow-up letter he expressed concern about his own mounting health problems. Cordier immediately took the matter up with Hammarskjold and an early return was decided upon. But events moved quickly causing Bunche himself to contact the Secretary-General direct, asking that he be relieved of his assignment owing to serious difficulties arising between himself and Lumumba which had brought his usefulness to an end. Being black had not lightened Bunche's task in the Congo -- on the contrary it had complicated matters for him. To some extent he found himself at a disadvantage since ironically, owing to their slave heritage, American blacks are not always held in the highest esteem by Africans.

The Secretary-General, who had been seeking someone to replace Bunche, finally in August appointed Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal of India as his personal representative, but the latter was unable to arrange his arrival in the Congo before Bunche's scheduled departure. As an interim measure the Secretary-General asked Cordier to proceed immediately to Leopoldville for the purpose of taking over from Bunche until Dayal should arrive. While there Cordier was to review the administration of

organization of the United Nations operation. Cordier readily agreed. He arrived in Leopoldville on August 28th and Bunche departed on the 30th.

Meanwhile in New York the Soviet Union complained to Hammarskjold about "an American, Cordier" having been sent to relieve Bunche. The USSR had already in the early weeks of the United Nations intervention in the Congo begun to be severely critical of the conduct of the United Nations operation and of Hammarskjold's interpretation of the Security Council mandate covering the United Nations force. In this they were joined by the Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, who maintained that the United Nations troops should be used to forcibly prevent the secession of Katanga.* When Hammarskjold would not agree to this interpretation, Lumumba in mid-August sought the direct assistance of the Soviet Union. Lumumba was still smarting from the fact that earlier that month Hammarskjold had proceeded to Katanga with the first contingents of the United Nations peacekeeping force without him and he accused Hammarskjold of connivance with Tshombe. Whereas Hammarskjold's purpose had been to introduce the United Nations troops into Katanga with as little friction as possible since Tshombe had been so opposed to the idea.

*The United Nations mandate under the Security Council resolution was to assist the Government in restoring law and order, assure the continuation of essential services, and effect the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo.

In response to Lumumba's appeal the Soviet Union made directly available to him a number of transport planes and other material assistance, thus making it a form of unilateral aid rather than through the agreed upon multilateral program of the United Nations. (The USSR had earlier signalled its intention of doing this in a statement in the Security Council on 8 August in which it affirmed the right of governments to respond to appeals for bilateral help from the Congolese Government).

Lumumba was making use of the Soviet transport planes to move Congolese troops loyal to him .

the province of Kasai, with the ultimate aim not only of subjecting Katanga, but of putting down a recent secessionist movement in South Kasai. This act of Lumumba's further seriously contributed to the already existing troubles in the Congo.

loyal to Lumumba
Congoese army units/were ferried into the Province of Kasai, first to Luluabourg and then to Bakwanga -- the capital of South Kasai and a center for diamond mining -- as the first step toward the invasion of Katanga proper. In Kasai there had been a history of periodic fighting between the Lulua and the Baluba tribes and in August tribal fighting had broken out again. In addition the King of the powerful Baluba tribe, Albert Kalondji, had declared South Kasai an autonomous state and had sought assistance from Tshombe. Lumumba's Congoese troops successfully occupied Bakwanga on 26 August. These soldiers, having been unpaid for two months and with no rations of their own, very soon started looting and requisitioning at random. In addition they became involved on the side of the Lulus in savage attacks on the Baluba. Hundreds of Baluba were reported killed or massacred by the Congoese army between 29 and 31 August. This was interpreted by the Baluba as a deliberate act of vengeance on Lumumba's part, directed against them because of the Kalondji secessionist movement.

When Cordier took over from Bunche at the end of August he found himself confronted not only with the uncertain aftermath of the

Kasai massacres but also with a serious dispute developing between President Kasavubu and Lumumba which carried with it all the portents of great power involvement. Kasavubu and Lumumba were not only at issue over certain of the latter's actions but both were seeking to establish and maintain power and the Soviet union had declared its full support in favor of Lumumba. By the time Cordier arrived on the scene this dispute had reached an eruptive stage and within a few days a constitutional crisis of serious proportions was threatening the internal order of the Congo.

Meanwhile, fearing a repetition of what had happened in Kasai, Hammarskjold, after consulting with the Congo Advisory Committee in New York (a committee composed of member states contributing military and other assistance to the United Nations force in the Congo) authorized Cordier to interpose United Nations troops to prevent further massacres, using force if necessary.

On 4 September the President of the Senate, Joseph Ileo came to Cordier's office with a delegation of tribal leaders of the Kasai Baluba. They were asking for United Nations help in preventing any more massacres. They expressed themselves as failing to understand how the Soviet Union, which to all intents was supporting the United Nations operation in the Congo, could at the same time be involved in ferrying Congolese army units into South Kasai and towards Katanga. They wondered how this could be reconciled with the United Nations effort.

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Cordier explained that the Congo Government had sought direct aid from the Soviet Union and that the ferrying of these troops by USSR planes was in response to a request from Lumumba. It was not part of a United Nations operation. He promised to do what he could to offset the trends in South Kasai and he informed them that the United Nations force now had instructions to intervene in tribal killings such as had occurred in Bakwanga.

Other factors in the current situation were presenting serious threats to law and order. Not only were there strong tribal rivalries among the soldiers in the Congolese army garrison in Leopoldville but they were also divided into pro-Lumumba and anti-Lumumba factions. Moreover the garrison was unruly, having been left without pay for two months. The Soviet planes that had arrived at Stanleyville to ferry more pro-Lumumba soldiers into South Kasai could also be used to bring them to Leopoldville if Lumumba chose to attempt a military showdown.

By 3 September Kasavubu was considering not only the arrest of Lumumba but the closing of Parliament and so informed Cordier. Just two days later, on 5 September, he received a cable from a friend in Europe warning him that Lumumba intended to overthrow him with the help of the Soviet Union and that his life was in danger. That evening Kasavubu took steps to dismiss Lumumba as Prime Minister and announced his decision over the radio, naming Joseph Ileo as Lumumba's successor. At the same time he requested the United

Nations to assume full responsibility for law and order and to place United Nations guards on the radio station, the Parliament and his own residence, as well as that of other leaders. (The United Nations was already guarding Lumumba's residence at the latter's request). Kasavubu also asked for the immediate closing of the airfields to all but United Nations aircraft. He appealed to the Congolese army to lay down their arms. Cordier was keeping the Secretary-General informed of these developments by cable.

Kasavubu's radio announcement was closely followed by a speech delivered over the radio by Lumumba denouncing Kasavubu and declaring that he was no longer Chief of State. Lumumba broadcast several more times during the night. The rift was now in the open.

In New York Hammarskjold urgently sought the legal interpretation of who should be considered the constitutional authority in the light of the controversy between the two men. It was finally determined that Kasavubu as Chief of State, was the legal authority and that it was he with whom the United Nations would have to deal until the dispute was resolved. He informed Cordier to this effect.

Hammarskjold also advised Cordier that the threat of large-scale violence gave the United Nations officials on the spot the right to act as they thought best in the circumstances, and that action to maintain law and order, provided it was in line with the general principles

of the organization and with the Security Council resolutions, could be undertaken in consultation with the constitutional authority, or at his request. Earlier he had instructed Cordier that time might be more important than comments from New York and that at any time they in the Congo might face a situation of complete disintegration of authority that would put them in a situation of emergency which in his view, would entitle them to greater freedom of action in the protection of law and order, adding that the "degree of disintegration thus widening their rights was a question of judgment."

In a further cable to Cordier on 5 September concerning the role of the United Nations Force and his, the Secretary-General's authorization to interpose United Nations troops if necessary, Hammarskjold injected the following rather ambiguous and to me rather disquieting comment at the end: "May I addirresponsible observationthat responsible people on the spot may permit themselves, within framework of principles which are imperative, what I could not justify doing myself, taking the risk of being disowned when it no longer matters."

During the night of 5-6 September the situation in the Congo was appraised by the UN Command as so dangerous as to call for emergency measures. Cordier consulted extensively with the military and civilian chiefs

of the United Nations operation. They agreed that the airfields in the Congo should be closed to all except United Nations traffic and that the Leopoldville radio should be temporarily shut down. It was hoped by these measures to insure freedom of movement for the United Nations force, immobilize the Congolese army outside Leopoldville and end incitements to the people over the radio. The restrictions would be lifted as soon as the risks to public order subsided to manageable proportions. Cordier discussed the steps with Dayal, who had just arrived. He then ordered them into effect, advising the Secretary-General immediately each step was taken, although regrettably the cable regarding the shutting down of the radio station did not arrive in New York until after Hammarskjold had already seen a press despatch about it, which unfortunately seemed to produce a negative reaction on Hammarskjold's part. Immediately following these events, Dag's cables to Cordier began to show a perceptible irascibility on the subject of the airports and the radio station. Notwithstanding this, however, in one exchange of cables with Cordier on 6 September about the actual date on which Dayal should assume full responsibility -- September 8th was agreed upon -- Hammarskjold conveyed to Cordier his warmest gratitude for his "wisdom and courage."

Subsequently it was stated that Hammarskjold was "dismayed"

when he learned of the steps Cordier had taken. In my opinion this was extraordinary in the light of the earlier exchanges of cables and consultations that had taken place. Also if this were the case, it was extraordinary that he did not immediately countermand them. On the contrary, in a cable to Cordier on 6 September he advised him to inform Lumumba's aide that he, Cordier, could not take responsibility for the re-opening of the radio station as it would create "a serious risk of an uncontrollable security situation."

In a statement to the Security Council on 9 September 1960 Hammarskjold submitted the question of the closing of the airports and the national radio to the Council for its consideration and instruction. In describing the events he said that the "two far-reaching steps" of an emergency nature which were taken by the United Nations representatives were "not" preceded by any reference of the matter to him because of the extreme urgency of the problem but that it took wisdom and courage to handle such a situation when one is "at the front." He emphasized that the steps taken could not be discussed in terms of partisanship, colonialism, or anti-colonialism. He repeated again that he had not been "consulted" but said he fully endorsed the action taken and he had not seen any reason so far to revise the decisions of his representatives. He stated that he assumed full personal responsibility for what had been done on his behalf and he did so convinced of the wisdom

of the actions and of their complete accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Security Council decisions, adjusted to a situation of unique complication. In his statement Hammarskjold also asked the Council to declare that all assistance to the Congo be channelled only through the United Nations. No instructions were forthcoming from the Security Council within the next few days and Hammarskjold himself eventually lifted the restrictions on 12 September after receiving what he considered were satisfactory assurances from Kasavubu, Lumumba and members of Parliament concerning the use of the airports and the radio station.

The fact that Hammarskjold emphasized that he had not been "consulted" was an interpretation that I was never able to quite understand. Could it be that he was taking the "diplomatic line" related to his earlier "irresponsible observation" as he called it, when he said that "responsible people on the spot might permit themselves to do what he could not justify doing himself, taking the risk of being "disowned" when it no longer mattered." Or was there a veiled repudiation of Cordier's judgment underlying those otherwise strong words of support?

As for Cordier, he himself never regretted his directive and always maintained that this action had averted a possible catastrophe. There were many others who held the same view, but there was also severe criticism of him from the Communist bloc and he began to be

a controversial figure. His action in any event bore out one of the well-known characteristics of Andrew Cordier -- he was not afraid to take decisions.

The incident became a "cause celebre" and the Soviet Union, which had for some time been severely critical of the Congo operation as interpreted and directed by Hammarskjold, was now further alienated. This situation was further exacerbated when on 14 September a young army group took over the administration of the government and on their own initiative expelled the Soviet and Czechoslovakian embassy personnel from the Congo. The Congolese army group was led by Colonel Mobutu, who was later to become President of the Congo. It was also he who, as Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, on the night of 5 September asked the Congolese army units in Leopoldville to turn in their arms to the United Nations, which they did.

On 8 September Dayal assumed his role as Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo and Cordier returned to New York. In the Security Council and later in the General Assembly Dag began to bear the full brunt of Soviet displeasure. At first there appeared to be no change in the relationship between Dag and Andy, perhaps due to the fact that not long after Cordier's return in September the General Assembly opened. This of

necessity kept them in a close working relationship since Cordier carried on in his accustomed role as head of the General Assembly Affairs section and immediate adviser to the President of the Assembly who for the Fifteenth Session was Frederick H. Boland of Ireland. There was much turmoil during that session due not only to the Congo but to the presence of thirty-two heads of State and government. Khrushchev was there, Tito, Castro, Nehru, Eisenhower, MacMillan, Nasser and others. Interestingly enough it was owing to Khrushchev that this "summit assembly" had come about. In August he had proposed that heads of government come to the General Assembly to thrash out the problems of disarmament but the Congo crisis overtook this and instead became the chief topic of discussion. It was a very heated session. In one notorious incident Khrushchev took off his shoe and banged it on his desk in the General Assembly Hall. On another occasion Boland in trying to restore order brought his gavel down so hard on the podium that he broke it. It was during this session that Khrushchev made his furious attacks on Hammarskjold, calling for his resignation, the abolishment of his post and the establishment of a "troika" or three-man administrative body to run the Secretariat, which would represent the three major political blocs, communist, non-communist

and non-aligned or "neutralist." Hammarskjold in turn delivered his now historic statements about how he interpreted his role and how he saw his duty to the Member States, declaring that he would remain at his post so long as it was the wish of all other Member countries. When Khrushchev left for home in October, while he had ^{Not} won direct support for his proposal, still there were signs of a general disposition on the part of the neutralist states, including India, to reach some accommodation with Soviet views. In my view this seems to have had an important impact on subsequent events as far as Cordier was concerned.

Cordier, Bunche and other immediate associates of Hammarskjold in the Secretariat were very close to Dag in those days of personal trial for him and they gave him their loyal support. However, as the weeks and months slipped into December and the General Assembly recessed until the spring, I thought I detected the beginning of a slow "sealing off" of Andy by Dag and a certain coolness on Dag's part. Cordier continued to attend the internal Congo meetings in the Secretary-General's conference room but I sensed -- and this was afterwards confirmed for me -- that he was no longer actively participating in the discussions. As Under-Secretary he continued to receive copies of the "Congo cables" and of the Congo Advisory Committee

meetings but one felt that this was a formality only. Whether Dag had advised him against participating in the Congo discussions or whether this developed as a result of Andy sensing Dag's displeasure, I do not know.

In any event it seemed to me the old confident relationship was no longer there. It reached a point where Dag would now come into Cordier's office with crisp impatience -- almost with disdain -- go over to his desk, pick up a paper and say "What is this?" in rather brittle tones. He might walk away with it in his hand or in an imperious manner give instructions as to how it was to be handled. This would take place in front of anyone who happened to be present. It was as though he was checking up on Andy and I sensed an air of tension on his part, almost as though he was deliberately seeking a confrontation. I had seen him "turn off" on other people before and I must confess I began to be worried and upset. It seemed to me too that Andy was becoming puzzled and embarrassed by this whole performance although he never actually said so to me. I knew he felt that his action in the Congo was justifiable and accepted by Dag in the first instance -- after all he had been congratulated for his wisdom and courage! But now I felt that Andy was beginning to wonder where he stood. I knew he was not the sort who would want to be considered as a political liability. Dag's moodiness could very well have been due to the pressures of the Congo but.

personally felt it had something to do with how he was now feeling about Cordier.

Politically, in my estimation, Andy Cordier was very even-handed. He could never be accused of taking a stand because of bias. He was an international civil servant in the true sense of the word. There was no bigotry in him that I ever saw and I believe he felt that all ideological lines could and should be crossed in order to achieve conciliation. This does not mean that he would condone or would not oppose what he considered was wrong morally or politically or that he approved of intimidating methods or other ways to force political agreement. While you could not easily put a label on Andrew Cordier, I would say he was a moderate, but a determined one. He never believed in allowing communications to break down or, to put it another way, he believed in keeping the lines open and he had faith in the ultimate solution of conflicts by peaceful means.

His action in the Congo, for which he came under eventual censure from some quarters, was not "anti" a member state but to preserve law and order in accordance with the United Nations mandate. For this reason it was inconceivable to him that the rift with the Soviet Union could not be resolved in due time, both for Hammarskjold and for himself, even though it had

proved otherwise for Trygve Lie in earlier years in the case of Korea. Andrew Cordier really believed that patient contact and negotiation would ultimately solve all problems with the Communist states and that "bygones would eventually become bygones."

In subsequent years he was portrayed by the author Conor Cruise O'Brien in a fictionalized account of the Congo as an "agent of the Central Intelligence Agency" specifically with regard to the death of Lumumba. He suffered for this later as President of Columbia University when his life was threatened because of it. This was a ridiculous assertion to all of us who knew him at the United Nations, and particularly to those of us who worked so closely with him. First of all it would not have been possible because he was no longer involved in the Congo operation at that period but in any event it would have been foreign to Andrew Cordier's nature. He was an international civil servant first and an American after and that was his philosophy in his relations with the United States Delegation to the United Nations. He could be just as independent in his attitude towards the United States as he was towards the Soviet Union or any other Member State. One former member of the United States Mission to the United Nations spoke thus of him -- that at the Mission they had always regarded

him with the highest respect because he was able to hold a most rigorous line of "impartial conduct" while at the same time he was able to facilitate "in an indispensable way" the political processes of the United Nations.

Cordier always strictly observed Article 100 of the Charter which states that "in the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the organization." It further states that "each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities." He spoke of the importance of this article to his dying day and in later years he expressed concern because he thought he could see a further drift away from it at the United Nations. Like Hammarskjold he emphasized the need for a truly international civil service. The staffing of the Secretariat was in his view a key point in the power struggle. It was no secret that the Soviet staff members did not always meet the Charter requirement in this respect as they more often than not came on the United Nations

staff not as independent international civil servants, but on the contrary were still under the discipline of their government. He felt that if this practice grew and the concept of an international civil service were to be abandoned and United Nations employees regarded as representing their particular governments, then the whole United Nations structure was weakened.

In the months that followed Cordier's return, no real constitutional government was functioning in the Congo, although the country was being administered by Mobutu's "College of Commissionaires" under President Kasavubu. There was continued internal political strife and a mounting distrust and harassment of the United Nations which made its task increasingly difficult. In Katanga there was the constant threat of secession by Tshombe as well as the continued presence there not only of Belgian political and military personnel but of other foreign military or paramilitary.

In November 1960 a development took place which was to have tragic consequences. Lumumba, accompanied by several of his supporters, left his compound and the protection of the United Nations. It was thought that his destination was Stanleyville in the Orientale Province where a pro-Lumumba group had set itself

up in power and that it was his intention to set up a government in opposition to Kasavubu and Mobutu. However Mobutu's men overtook him in Kasai, arrested him and beat him up. He was returned to Leopoldville where he was kept under detention for several months by Mobutu. Finally in January Kasavubu and Mobutu came to the conclusion that it would be in their interest to transfer Lumumba to Katanga. This they allegedly did with the knowledge and agreement of Tshombe. Lumumba and two of his supporters were placed aboard an Air Congo plane with an escort of Baluba soldiers who had not forgotten the August massacres of their people and Lumumba and his friends suffered severe beatings at their hands. It was learned later that he died immediately following his arrival in Elizabethville, although word of his death did not come to light until the following month. The true circumstances of how he met his death were never established but a United Nations Commission of Investigation concluded that he and his companions died on 17 January 1961, the night of his arrival in Elizabethville. It was presumed that he died at the hands of his political opponents.

In March the United Nations suffered another serious setback when the Soviet Union, after another of its attacks on Hammarskjold, announced that it would not contribute to the costs of the United Nations Operation in the Congo. ^{under DeGaulle} France/soon followed suit,

taking the position that the United Nations operation in the Congo constituted interference in the domestic affairs of that country. Neither the USSR nor France ever did alter their positions in this matter, adding greatly to the financial problems of the organization and raising serious questions about the future financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Something was taking place with Cordier at this time that may have had a little to do with the turn of events later as far as he was concerned. As I have earlier intimated, Andy Cordier was not one given to explanations. If he was feeling ill or emotionally upset for family or other reasons, he would never explain. He might just become silent or moody, and in periods like that he would be more than ever inclined to reply in words of one syllable. I repeat my personal belief that his reluctance to explain himself may at times have created real misunderstandings for him with his colleagues or even his friends. For instance during the months that followed his return from the Congo in August 1960, he seemed to be very sluggish. I remember thinking that his eyes had a yellowish tinge. He would go to the bathroom frequently and he was unnaturally sleepy -- sometimes he would have three or four naps a day going between his own office and the bedroom which was part of the Secretary-General's conference suite. This went on for some time. I do

not think he ever said to anyone "I don't feel well" or that it occurred to him that what was happening was being observed or commented on and that he should perhaps offer some explanation.

For a long time I put it down to an emotional upset brought about by the "falling out", if you could call it that, with Hammarskjold over the closing of the airports and the radio station in the Congo. But after a time I began to wonder if it was not a health problem. Dag too commenced to worry about Cordier's health. In the early part of 1961 he asked me privately one day how I thought "Andy was", that he seemed to be in "terrible shape." I acknowledged that this seemed to be the case and immediately afterwards -- and without telling Cordier why -- I did my part in trying to persuade him to have a physical examination. Others were urging the same thing but it was difficult to convince him that this was necessary for he did not have much respect for illness and he considered that it was something that could be overcome by sheer willpower -- I expect he did not "believe" in illness because he had always enjoyed such robust health.

It took some doing, but he was finally persuaded to enter the hospital for a complete check-up, his first. To everyone's surprise he received a glowing medical report -- he was in

"perfect physical condition." The results of that examination struck me as being rather unrealistic at that time, and in looking back now at what developed in subsequent years relative to his health and the eventual diagnosis of hepatic cirrhosis of the liver, I wonder if he was not suffering from hepatitis then, *or mononucleosis* and no one was aware of it, not even himself. Perhaps this was the beginning of that liver degeneration which was to plague him later. Any other person would have given in much sooner and sought medical help. Perhaps if he had done so he would have enjoyed better health in later life, but by the time he underwent the physical examination at the hospital, doubtless the hepatic infection -- if in fact it ever existed -- was no longer detectable.

When Andy Cordier was approaching sixty I began to think he was overly concerned about his age for in the years immediately preceding this "eventful" birthday -- which was to take place in 1961 -- he would bring up the subject quite often, pointing out just how long it was before he would reach sixty. I would always chide him about being too preoccupied with his age, and it worried me that he should give it so much thought. However we never did get beyond the point of jesting about it. Frankly I thought the primary reason was his fear of growing old and being

no longer useful, and I did not discover until a long time later that he had been thinking in other terms too; that he felt he should leave the United Nations at age sixty whether he wished to or not because it was the mandatory retiring age and because, according to his own words to me, he had firmly supported the Office of Personnel in carrying out this policy with respect to other staff members. Another underlying concern seemed to be that he should leave at retirement age to make way for a national from one of the new Member States. The United Nations membership had enlarged considerably in 1955 and again in 1960 and according to Cordier he had engaged in several conversations with Hammarskjold about the administrative and political implications of this. I did not know it then, but there was also a question in his mind as to whether he should make a move now if he were going to enter any other activity prior to his declining years. Alternatively there was another consideration/^{in conflict with the above}-- he was under a term contract as were the other Under-Secretaries, the period of which would take him up to and three months beyond the term of the incumbent Secretary-General.

However, the decision as to when and whether to retire because of his age was rather taken out of his hands when after the Congo events he became the centre of controversy, along to a lesser degree with other Americans, over a preponderance of United States influence

around the Secretary-General. His post, which had hitherto been considered outside the geographical distribution pattern, was suddenly no longer in this category. During the course of the General Assembly the Soviet Union had accused Hammarskjold of favouring the Western bloc and particularly the United States in the composition and administration of the Secretariat, especially at the higher levels. Such Communist complaints did not to my knowledge surface until the Congo crisis. Cordier was a particular target because of the decisions he had taken in the Congo during those few days in September 1960. However Cordier was aware too that the Soviets had long been restive over what they considered was his "control" of the parliamentary procedure in the General Assembly, and hence, in their view whoever might be President. Many years before Vyshinsky had chided him about this.

The pressure on Hammarskjold to reduce the number of Americans on his top staff, justified or no, continued into 1961 and the Soviet Union carried its campaign into the discussions of an Expert Committee which had been created by the General Assembly in 1959 to review the activities and organization of the Secretariat. Oddly enough the United States expert on the Committee supported the Soviet premise, basing his position on the principle of protecting the Secretary-General from just such accusations in the future. The

stand taken by the United States expert, who was Leland Goodrich of Columbia University, had an adverse effect so far as Cordier's future was concerned. There was an ironical twist to this since Cordier was the one who had suggested Goodrich for the Committee. Goodrich was an expert on the United Nations and had served with Cordier on the United States Delegation at the San Francisco Charter conference in 1945. Although they could not foresee it then, Goodrich and Cordier were later to find themselves closely associated at Columbia University, when the latter became Dean of the School of International Affairs.

For whatever the reason or reasons, Hammarskjold eventually arrived at the conclusion that Cordier was the American whom he should remove from his immediate orbit. Whether the Soviet Union pointed directly at Cordier and Dag yielded to political pressure in that sense, I do not know, for at the time it was no secret that Dag was listening to the advice of others around him in the Secretariat who were counselling him strongly to effect a change in the Cordier post -- someone once observed of Dag that "he did not always know how much he was advised." Some of this advice I was informed at the time -- and so was Cordier -- was allegedly coming from one of Cordier's fellow Under-Secretaries, an Indian national. This could have been a reflection of the official view of India or it could even have been inspired by Dayal from the Congo, whose recently published book on his Congo experience with the United Nations reveals him to be contemptuously critical of Cordier, whom incidentally he hardly knew, and the latter's role in the Congo during those few days that they had overlapped. Perhaps in his heart Dag

felt able to justify his decision because of other factors, such as Cordier's age and some puzzlement over the state of his health. Or perhaps it was just a follow-through of that "irresponsible observation" which he had earlier made in his cable to Cordier in the Congo in 1960.

To no one's surprise but Andy's, Dag suddenly proposed to him on 17 May 1961 that in order to "help out" the situation he should relinquish his role as Executive Assistant but remain on at the United Nations in the General Assembly role. Cordier had "made the post so powerful" that it required a splitting of the functions. He announced to Andy that he already had someone in mind for the Executive Assistant post -- it was Narasimhan, the Indian national who was already Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs. Hammarskjold added that this was part of a general reorganization of top level staff which he intended to carry out as a matter of some urgency and that he wished to have it completed in a few weeks.

Dag had come to Cordier's office almost casually to make this proposal. What it meant was, of course, that Andy would be syphoned off from the Secretary-General and from all the meaningful activity and leadership in the Secretariat of which he had so long been a part; in essence it meant a repudiation of him. Unprepared

as he was, or as I thought he was, Cordier reacted against the idea immediately Dag had proposed it. He informed Hammarskjold that he did not see how he could accept the reduced role, or the "splitting of the post" as it was described, and that he would prefer to resign. According to Cordier, Dag became agitated and upset at this, asked if it was an "ultimatum" and after further conversation departed Andy's office in an angry mood. My private impression then was that Hammarskjold probably did not want Cordier to make "waves" by resigning and also he was taken by surprise for he thought that Cordier felt so privileged to be working with him and the United Nations that he would make any sacrifice to stay on.

I was there at my desk that day when Dag came to Andy's office and when he left. Cordier was so disturbed that he told me right away what had happened. He was extremely surprised and upset not only at Hammarskjold's proposal but at the way it had been presented as it seemed to reflect the position of the Soviet Union and the neutralist states. After all it is one thing to "offer" to make room for reorganization; it is another to be asked to "move over" to improve the situation. It had all come as a distinct shock although as I recall it there were those who had been warning Andy Cordier for some time that all was not well and that something like this could happen. But Cordier's esteem and

affection for and his confidence in Dag were such that I do not think he believed what he had been hearing. One of his colleagues later said of him that for all his shrewdness, Andy was in some respects innocent in the ways of men.

All the more disconcerting was the fact that this conversation took place on 17 May 1961, the very day that Cordier was scheduled to depart on a two weeks trip beginning with speaking engagements in Minneapolis and in Canton, Ohio. These were to be immediately followed by an official trip to Geneva and the Middle East. His timetable called for a few hours' stopover in New York on Sunday, 20 May en route to London, where he planned to spend a few days with this daughter Louise before proceeding to Geneva, Beirut and Jerusalem. A press release about the trip had been issued the preceding day, May 16th, and a copy would in all likelihood have been in Dag's hands. Moreover the schedule would certainly have been worked out with Dag prior to that.

Cordier did not change his plans and departed a few hours after this conversation. Dag attempted to reach him on Sunday during his stopover in New York and left messages for Andy to call him, but Cordier did not do so. On Monday morning, Bill Ranallo, Hammarskjold's aide came to me in great distress, saying "What's the idea? What's wrong with Cordier?" He did not return

the Secretary-General's call over the week-end. The Secretary-General was anxious to talk to him." This was an unheard of thing in Bill's mind, in all our minds, but obviously Bill was unaware of what had happened. I knew by this act of omission how deeply shaken Andrew Cordier must be.

Questions arose in my mind about the date and the hour which Hammarskjold had chosen to put this proposal to Cordier. Regrettably the timing almost appeared to be contrived. Had he deliberately waited until he knew Cordier would be going off on his trip? And if so, why? Was it because he wanted to give him a cooling off period? It would almost seem so as he would have had to know about the trip, especially the official United Nations part of it -- and then there was that press release outlining Andy's timetable which had come out the previous day. Or was it even possible that the timing of the official trip was deliberate on Hammarskjold's part? On the other hand, to give Hammarskjold his due, it is possible that he had become panicky about the timing of his proposed "reorganization" and felt that he could not afford to await Andy's return two weeks hence. For whatever the reason, I felt that the time which he chose was unfortunate.

It was from London that Cordier mailed to me his letter of

resignation with a brief instruction to transmit it to the Secretary-General. There was no other comment, no private letter of explanation to me. The letter was dated 23 May 1961 and I learned later that it was his daughter, Louise who had typed it for him. I was chagrined and stunned, both at the drastic step he had taken and the fact that he had entrusted me with the task of transmitting it. I knew that he was deeply disturbed when he left, but even so I had not expected such quick and decisive action. My first inclination was to hang on to the letter for I felt that, given a few days reflection after he reached the Middle East, he might have second thoughts and I wondered if this was why he had forwarded the letter to me first instead of sending it directly to Hammarskjold. I was in a dilemma. I searched for Andy's Special Assistant, Leo Malania and could not find him. Then as I recall it, I phoned a close associate of Cordier's on the 38th floor, Sir Alexander MacFarquhar. I told him I had something important to show him. He came immediately to Andy's office and read the letter. I conveyed to him my desire to "sit" on the letter but he felt I had no alternative but to do as Andy had asked. Not long after that Leo Malania appeared on the scene -- I showed him the letter and he too felt that I had no alternative. Before the day had come to an end I had transmitted the letter to Hammarskjold's assistant. It was done with a heavy heart, not only because I knew how upset Cordier must be but also because I was loathe to think of him leaving the organization. However in my heart I was applauding him for

the courageous stand he had taken.

From London Cordier continued on with his trip to the Middle East and Geneva. He returned to New York on June 1st via London where he again spent a few days. It is interesting to note that although Hammarskjold was in London at the same time their paths did not cross. Hammarskjold was in England to receive an honorary degree from Oxford University. The address which he delivered on that occasion entitled "The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact" attracted wide comment. In Volume 5 of their series on the "Public Papers of the Secretaries-General" Cordier and Foote state that this lecture was prepared with great care and was partly an elaboration of drafts dictated during the Assembly Session in case the Soviet Union should formally submit for the agenda Khrushchev's proposal for a three-man executive -- or "troika" -- to replace the office of the Secretary-General.

After Cordier's return to New York Dag asked him to reconsider but he stuck firmly to his decision. He displayed moral courage there because he had no plans, no job to go to and considerable family responsibility. During that month he was away again on pre-arranged engagements; from 3-5 June receiving an honorary degree from the Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon; on 11 and 12 June he was in Grenville, Ohio, where he was awarded an honorary degree by Denison University; on 21 and 22 June he attended

a conference in Racine, Wisconsin. It was fortuitous that these events came when they did as they were badly needed for his morale and indeed to help build up an independence of outlook and spirit.

In his letter of May 17th Cordier had suggested that his resignation should take effect in August, before which he would like to take advantage of certain leave entitlements in June and July. This was very unlike him as he had never before used his leave entitlements. Evidently he wished to remove himself from the scene as quickly as possible because if this plan were adopted it would mean that he would not be on duty beyond the end of May. When Hammarskjold had finally accepted the idea of Cordier's resignation he asked if as a special favour he would remain on through the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly in the role of Under Secretary for General Assembly and Related Affairs -- the session would begin in September. The Executive Assistant post would be assumed on 1 August by the Indian Under-Secretary, Narasimhan but with the title of "Chef de Cabinet" rather than "Executive Assistant." Cordier finally agreed to this "transitional arrangement" as it was called. Perhaps he felt it would give him time to find something else to do -- perhaps also it was a desire to help Hammarskjold through a difficult period, for it was anticipated that the Sixteenth Session would be as difficult as the previous one for Hammarskjold.

Dag now prepared a formal reply to Andy's letter which he dated 19 June 1961. In it Dag related Cordier's resignation to his desire "to assist in the adjustment of posts" and to Cordier's wish to make plans for a new career in the coming years. He announced the change at his press conference on 26 June 1961, almost casually, and released the text of his own letter. The die was now cast. The full text of Cordier's letter, however, was never published, and only appears in excerpt form in Volume 5 of the "Public Papers of the Secretaries-General" which Cordier published many years later. Hammarskjold's announcement of the new "shifting of responsibilities" was dropped so casually at the June 26th press conference that the correspondents did not make very much of it at the time. It was only later that they began to evaluate and look into it.

I did not blame Andrew Cordier for resigning instead of accepting the reduced role. It goes without saying that after all that the United Nations organization had meant to him and after all that he had meant to it, he could not very well sit on the sidelines now. It would not only have been self-destructive but bad too for staff morale in the Secretariat. There were those other considerations too -- the question of his age and the need for more top posts to be made available to the new Member States.

However, in the light of his concern about retiring at age sixty because it was "policy", it was ironical later to note the continued presence long after his departure of several Under-Secretaries who were far beyond retirement age. This was political, of course, and rationalized in part by "No one available to replace", term contracts, or other considerations.

After I had recovered from the shock of Cordier's resignation, in my heart I supported him for it. I felt it would give him a chance for the new career which he needed. It would also remove him from the atmosphere of competition for Hammarskjold's attention and esteem and the rather exaggerated adulation of him which I did not think was doing anybody any good, merited as it might be by Dag himself. Andy's wife Dorothy took a different view from mine. She felt that the Secretary-General needed her husband and for this reason she was distressed because he had resigned. I believe that she hoped for a reversal of the decision. Perhaps if she had had the opportunity that I had had to witness what was taking place she may have felt differently.

With his extraordinary intelligence and sensitivity Hammarskjold must have carefully weighed the consequences of syphoning of Andrew Cordier, so far as his own image was concerned, and in the face of it decided to take the risk of being accused of bowing to the

pressure of the Soviet Union which he had hitherto so bravely resisted. Tragically the steps which he had taken with regard to Cordier's post seemed to have little or no effect on the Communist attitude towards him, if indeed appeasement was his intention. He had gained nothing by it politically. The scourging of Dag by the USSR continued long after Cordier's resignation was announced. There was no relenting by the Soviet Union -- he was suffering in the same way as had Trygve Lie. And he had created a question in the minds of many of his friends and supporters as to his motivations.

One wonders if Dag had any real understanding of Cordier as a person, of his ego and his pride, or even of his unique role until after he had approached him to accept the reduced function and Cordier had reacted by resigning. When the resignation was made public there were many unhappy reactions in the Secretariat and from the press and delegations. From the knowledgeable journalists there came expressions of disappointment and questioning about Dag. The letters which Cordier received from his friends in the international field contained words of praise, encouragement and support.

Cordier stayed on in his old office adjoining Hammarskjold's because that seemed to be the way Dag wanted it; in fact, according to Andy the Secretary-General kept referring to the new arrangement

as a "temporary thing." He took no steps to formally notify the Secretariat of Cordier's or Narasimhan's new functions. As a result Cordier found himself having to advise his Secretariat colleagues by phone that as of August 1st they must deal with the newly appointed Chef de Cabinet rather than him. ^{As a matter of fact} /Dag seemed to have developed an ambivalent attitude about the whole affair.

I do not know what role, if any, the United States Government was playing in those days with regard to Andy Cordier. If they made any significant gesture of support it was obscure to me and was never mentioned by Andy. I was never to know whether they had ever questioned or lodged a protest with Hammarskjold about the Cordier "resignation" and the reasons for it, or indeed whether Hammarskjold ever consulted them about the decision he was about to take. And there was no evidence to my knowledge of Cordier having discussed his situation with friends in the United States Government either prior to or after his resignation. But whatever may have transpired, I felt that some positive gesture should have been made to Cordier by the State Department, since after all he had been one of their distinguished Americans in the United Nations, and a former member of the State Department, but so far as I knew nothing was forthcoming. Kennedy was President then and Adlai Stevenson was the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Dean Rusk was Secretary

of State. Rusk and Stevenson were old friends of Cordier's. Cordier had been respected and esteemed at the United Nations -- and now he had gone through a bad time politically and psychologically. It would have been nice to have offered him an ambassadorial post, or other special assignment with the State Department. I felt they should have stood by him. Perhaps they did, I do not know. Certainly it was never apparent to me.

Everyone around us seemed dispirited in the months that followed between May 1961 and the time of Hammarskjold's death in September. There were not only the continuing Congo troubles but there was this unhappy embarrassing situation about Andy Cordier. Ralph Bunche was unhappy and thought he should offer to resign instead of Cordier. He informed Cordier about his feelings and later even went so far as to tender his resignation which of course was not accepted by Hammarskjold. No one knew quite how to behave toward Cordier now. People were embarrassed, upset and unsure of where he now stood with Dag. He no longer had the same responsibilities and therefore he no longer had the same "clout". There was still much underlying tension with Dag, although once the storm of the resignation was over I thought Dag's attitude toward Cordier began to improve. Fortunately for Cordier the construction of the new library building continued to be his preoccupation and responsibility. This had kept him occupied since the fall of 1960 and would continue to do so until late in 1961.

In the Congo, on 15 July 1961, in response to United Nations initiatives, there was a reconvening of the Congolese Parliament and in August a new coalition government was formed under the leadership of Cyrille Adoula, head of the trade union movement, with Kasavubu as President. The new coalition successfully brought together all factions in the Congo with the exception of Moise Tshombe and the Province of Katanga. Because of these positive developments Hammarskjold thought it was now possible for him to think in terms of scaling down the size of the United Nations operation in the Congo which had reached major proportions. Consequently in mid-August he indicated to his representative in Leopoldville, Sture Linner that he would be prepared to go to Leopoldville for a few days to discuss the place of the United Nations in the present and future Congo picture. This however would require an invitation from either Adoula or Kasavubu, with the concurrence of the new Congolese cabinet. It was September 10th before Adoula was able to send him the letter of invitation which he needed. Hammarskjold now prepared to leave for the Congo on 12 September. On his return he intended to prepare a new report on the Congo based on his own first-hand observations which he could submit to the General Assembly. In addition to the original intention of his visit -- which had been to discuss the future of the United Nations operation in the Congo -- he was concerned about certain developments which had taken place in Katanga since August regarding the expulsion of the mercenaries from there. He also hoped that his visit to the Congo might be the means of bringing Tshombe and Adoula together.

Hammarskjold left New York on 12 September, fully expecting to return in time for the opening of the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly on 19 September. Unfortunately this was not to be the case as events in Katanga overtook the original purpose of his trip. The United Nations action in Katanga which had been launched to round up European officers and mercenaries, suddenly erupted into outright hostilities between the United Nations forces and Tshombe's mercenary-led gendarmerie. Hammarskjold was to learn about the fighting while he was en route to the Congo. To add to the difficulties, a serious confusion arose as to the real intention of the United Nations action since it came to be described by United Nations representatives on the spot as an operation to "end the secession" of Katanga. This was distressing to Hammarskjold as it was going far beyond the United Nations mandate and was certainly not the original intention of the exercise. Because of the serious turn of events, Hammarskjold was forced to postpone the date of his return to New York and in an attempt to resolve the difficulties, arranged a meeting with Moise Tshombe in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia for 17 September.

About a month prior to this I had gone off to Canada on my vacation, returning to New York only a few days after Hammarskjold's departure for the Congo with his special adviser on African Affairs, Heinrich Wieschoff -- and William Ranallo, his personal aide. Hammarskjold had worked so closely with Wieschoff during this crisis period in the Congo that there were those who were now referring to him as the "eminence grise" of Hammarskjold. I recall _____

how surprised I was that Dag had decided on this trip so close to the opening of the General Assembly which would I knew be an important one for him both politically and personally.

One of the first things Cordier said to me was that he was feeling much better about his relationship with Dag. They had lunched together on the day of Dag's departure and afterwards had gone for a stroll in the gardens to look at the peacocks, which was a favorite pastime of Dag's. During his trips to Geneva he had become intrigued with the peacocks which roam the grounds of the Palais des Nations and had asked the Geneva office to acquire some for the United Nations in New York. On learning of this the Indian staff members in Geneva became quite concerned since in India the peacock is looked on as a bird of ill omen. They urged that every effort be made to persuade Dag to change his mind, but to no avail. Their admonitions went unheeded and a pair of peacocks were eventually placed in the gardens in New York.

Dag and Andy concluded their walk that day by a visit to the new library building to check on its progress. Cordier recalls that they had a warm and friendly chat just as of old. During the conversation Hammarskjold indicated to Cordier that the "new arrangement" was not working out as he had hoped and that when he returned from the Congo he would have to "make a change." Bunche and Cordier accompanied Dag to the airport -- he was seemingly in an optimistic frame of mind.


On September 17th, which was a Sunday, we were working at the office when suddenly over the radio came the announcement that Hammarskjold's plane was half an hour overdue at Ndola where he was to meet with Tshombe. Cordier's reaction was instantaneous. He said "He is gone -- Dag would never be half an hour late for anything." This was at six p.m. New York time. The hours dragged on and Hammarskjold's plane never showed up. It was not discovered until the following day in the spot where it had crashed, just nine and a half miles west of Ndola. Hammarskjold, and all fifteen staff members and crew travelling with him died in that accident, including Wieschoff and Ranallo who had left with him from New York. Everyone was stunned and saddened. This was a crushing blow to the organization and a tragic loss of life. There was grieving for Hammarskjold and all those who had died with him.

In the view of some, perhaps this was the only answer for the brilliant but sensitive Hammarskjold who had risked his political and diplomatic reputation as well as his peace of mind for the Congo. Through the strong and often courageous stands he had taken he had made bitter enemies for himself on all sides, the most serious of which was the Soviet Union, whose unrelenting displeasure he had incurred, ^{thus} jeopardizing his effectiveness and his future with the organization, as had his Scandinavian predecessor, Trygve Lie.

By an unusual coincidence it was on the same date thirteen

years before --17 September 1948--that Count Folk Bernadotte of Sweden, the United Nations Mediator for Palestine, had met his death by assassination in Jerusalem. The eerie conclusion to the story of the peacocks was that a day or two after Hammarskjold's departure from New York, one of the peacocks became ill and after several days of illness died on the same date as the plane crash.

From the beginning the Congo had had ominous overtones and all through the long months preceding Hammarskjold's death, there seemed to be a dark presence hanging over the Secretary-General's office. These few words are quite



inadequate to describe the atmosphere in which we laboured. The tragic air crash which cost Dag Hammarskjold and those fifteen others their lives seemed to be the somber finale to this most somber drama. A new Congo chapter was to begin under U Thant, Hammarskjold's successor, but nevertheless the Congo was to continue to be a ^{major} political problem for the United Nations until 1963. The financial difficulties resulting from it remained for many years.

As I sit here just sixteen years later it is hard to believe that so many of the leading protagonists of the Congo drama of 1960 and 1961 have passed away. Lumumba, Hammarskjold and Tshombe all met untimely deaths. Of the others who played leading roles, Ralph Bunche has died, so has Andrew Cordier. None of these men lived long enough to put their own personal story down on paper of those violent historic days. Khrushchev is gone too but he was one who survived long enough to publish his memoirs.

In my view Andy Cordier never got over Hammarskjold's death nor the unfortunate circumstances surrounding his own last year at the United Nations. He was possessed by a kind of terrible obsession about these events which never gave him surcease. While I know he felt justified about the decision he had taken in the Congo, nevertheless it was to bedevil him up to the time of his death. Was it his action that had triggered Dag's terrible ordeal with the Soviet Union or had enough antipathy already been generated over the Congo that it would have happened anyway? Had he misinterpreted Dag's cables -- he was always wanting to read and re-read those ^{the} in/later years? There were other

questions -- were there circumstances surrounding Hammarskjold's death that had not yet been revealed? He was still seeking to find the answers up until the time he died.

For the rest of his own life, however, Andrew Cordier's attitude towards Hammarskjold remained one of admiration, loyalty and friendship. He led the initiatives in memorializing him. The library building, completed after Hammarskjold's death, was through Cordier's initiative, dedicated in his name. Cordier established a United States Committee to raise funds for the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation which had been established in Sweden to honour Dag's memory. He instituted a Dag Hammarskjold Memorial Lecture Series at Columbia University and later dedicated a reception room in the new School of International Affairs in memory of him. Immediately after the crash it was Cordier who coordinated the arrangements for the investigation at Ndola, the bringing home of the bodies, the memorial services, the arrangements for the disposition of Dag's papers.

In the seven week inter-regnum period between Dag's death and the appointment in November of U Thant as Acting Secretary-General, Cordier became a kind of rallying point for the Secretariat once again and assumed his old central role for the time being. The Soviet Union was not happy about this in spite of the fact

that Cordier had long since announced his intention to retire, and the USSR representative publicly accused him of assuming "dictatorship" of the Secretariat. Cordier felt called upon to defend himself, stressing that no one had "assumed control" but that among the senior officials it was a matter of continuous consultation in order to keep the Secretariat running efficiently until a successor to Hammarskjold was named.

The Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly opened in September 1961 two days after Hammarskjold's death. Cordier was there to fill his accustomed role. The President for that session was Mongi Slim of Tunisia. Cordier had a great admiration for him and^{they} developed a good working relationship. On 3 November 1961 U Thant was formally named Acting Secretary-General to serve for the unexpired term of Dag Hammarskjold. He assumed the seat on the podium to the right of the President where his predecessors, Lie and Hammarskjold had sat. The session finally concluded in February 1962 and Cordier remained to the end, fulfilling his commitment to Hammarskjold which was later reinforced by a similar request from U Thant. He spoke to U Thant about leaving the organization at the end of December 1961, when the Assembly recessed, but at U Thant's request he agreed to remain for the resumption of the session and until February when it would finally be completed.

At the beginning, Cordier's relationship with U Thant was not

a very close one, although they were not strangers to one another for U Thant had served for several years at the Permanent Representative of Burma to the United Nations. In the months following his appointment U Thant kept quite aloof, never once to my knowledge stopping by Cordier's office on the 38th floor, which was next to his, to greet him, and there was no sign of a close rapport between them in the offices downstairs behind the General Assembly Hall. This may have been entirely due to U Thant's aloof temperament but nonetheless his behaviour did create some questions in my mind. I began to wonder if he felt some antipathy towards Cordier or if he found it embarrassing to have Cordier around owing to the militant attitude of the Soviet Union. However I do believe that their work together in the General Assembly opened up new areas of understanding between them and as the years passed I noticed that they seemed to develop a friendlier relationship. When Cordier became President of Columbia University it was he who saw to it that U Thant received an honorary degree from that institution and the U Thant papers were included with those of Lie and Hammarskjold in the "Public Papers" series.

For Cordier the months at the United Nations following his resignation, and particularly following Hammarskjold's death, were an anti-climax. It was not an easy period since he knew he was phasing out but he had good staying power and he saw it through with

dogged determination. There was one great compensation and that was that he was able to see the new library building through to its completion and dedication. The dedication ceremonies -- and the library symposium which formed part of them -- took place in November 1961/^{and}were planned and coordinated by Cordier. Librarians from all over the world were invited. Cordier's letters to symposium participants indicate thoughtful and precise arrangements. The panel /papers were forwarded to each participant as they were received in order to enhance the awareness of the participants in the panel discussions. It was a stirring event for the library world and they reacted with deep appreciation. The building bore the mark of Hammarskjold in its conception and planning and artistically he left his mark. In the large penthouse lounge there is a mural by the Swedish artist, Bo Beskow, friend of Hammarskjold. In the main entrance hangs a painting by the well known artist Fritz Glarner, whose work Hammarskjold admired greatly. The building was dedicated in Hammarskjold's name and as a memorial to him.

Dorothy Cordier was very concerned about her husband after his resignation and worried about how he would adjust to a future without the United Nations. She set about converting one of the bedrooms at home into a study and Louise joined in selecting the furnishings. Previous to that he had never used any room in the

Great Neck house as a study, possibly because his time was so fully occupied at the United Nations, there were no hours left to work at home and he did not feel the need of it.

During the months following the announcement of his resignation Cordier was approached by a number of publishers for his memoirs and he received job offers from several universities and foundations. But he seemed reluctant to make a choice and kept postponing any decision about his future until actually the last week of January 1962 when Grayson Kirk, then President of Columbia University, and an old friend from State Department days, proposed to him that he take over the post of Dean of the School of International Affairs at Columbia. Now there was no hesitancy on his part. It seemed to be just what he was looking for and he accepted within a few days. On 6 February 1962 there was a United Nations press release announcing his appointment to the Columbia post which was to take effect on 1 July 1962. The die was cast/^{once}again for Andrew Cordier.

There were a number of farewell events for him, among them a luncheon given by the City of New York, a large reception by the United States Mission to the United Nations, and a private dinner by Adlai Stevenson, then Permanent Representative to the United Nations. But later in recounting the events to one of his

friends Cordier said that topping all of the occasions in sweeping manifestations of friendship and affection was the farewell party given for him by the Secretariat staff in New York on 21 February 1961. It was an enormous reception with well over 1,000 people present and many more signature on the list. There had been nothing like it before at the United Nations and it was a significant tribute to him. But because everyone knew how Cordier was feeling and because he was ^{so} affectionately regarded by many, there were few dry eyes in the Delegates' Dining room that evening. No one had wanted it to end this way.

One of the features of the evening was a mammoth cake which had been created in the shape of the United Nations buildings. That evening he received three gifts which he always cherished -- one a landscape painting by the American artist, Daniel Garber. There was also a small wood model of the United Nations complex inscribed with the words "To Andrew Cordier who helped build the United Nations." On behalf of the sixteen former Presidents of the General Assembly, Mongi Slim presented him with an inscribed silver tray bearing their signatures and warm words of gratitude and affection. In his remarks Mongi Slim said of Cordier that he was an "international civil servant who has placed the interests of the international organization above any national interests. He deserves the gratitude of us all for what he has done on behalf

of the happiness of all peoples and understanding, cooperation and mutual confidence among all nations."

A good insight can be gained into Cordier's character and personality and how highly he was regarded by the staff from the announcement of the reception which came out in the form of a mock "Daily Journal" (the daily publication giving the meetings' schedule of the United Nations). It described the party as a "monster rally" to pay tribute to Andrew Cordier for his "inspiration, activities, midnight hours, humanity, impassivity and courage." It went on to say that the "report of the Secretary-General" on the subject of Andrew Cordier and the "comments, official, unofficial, written, oral, unspoken of 4,000 staff members" had not yet been written and probably never would be. In the last "item" of the Journal he was lauded as being "a source of all replies to awkward questions; for taking decisions which no one else had the courage to take, for covering up the shortcomings of staff members; for caring for the individual problems of officials high and low, and for being an example of what it means to be an international civil servant."

Andrew Cordier officially concluded his United Nations career at the end of February 1962 but remained on in the United Nations building for another month to wind up his affairs. The

last month was spent downstairs in his former General Assembly office "behind the podium." Up to then Andy had retained his old office on the 38th floor. Since mention is made of this in the Urquhart book on "Hammarskjold", I have felt it necessary to make reference to it more than once in this narrative. My impression was that Andy seemed to think he would be able to occupy that office until he left the building altogether, but his successor, Narasimhan had been pressing for some months to take over this room and coincident with Cordier's last official day I received word from Narasimhan's office that "we had to be out tomorrow." I reacted with some surprise for I had heard nothing about it prior to this and as I recall Cordier was away on a short business trip at the time. However since it was made to sound like an "order" I complied and quickly made the move to the offices on the lower level within the prescribed time. As I had little or no communication with U Thant then, I did not feel in a position to consult him in Cordier's absence.

As for Cordier, he may have felt that with the brief time remaining to him, his long occupancy of that office and the psychological association with it as far as everyone was concerned, it would be more appropriate for him to remain there until his final day in the building, or perhaps he may have just been offering a stubborn resistance to his Indian colleague who, according to all that Cordier had heard, had shown an unnatural eagerness to take over his post

in the first instance. In any event I felt that it was an added embarrassment to Cordier to have to spend his last month downstairs behind the General Assembly Hall and moreover it was difficult to operate from there. However he said very little about it to me. But since there had been no change up to then, for whatever the reason, I felt it would have been a courtesy to leave things as they were and I often wondered why U Thant took no stand on this. Indeed he never said a word to my knowledge. But then perhaps he did not know how it had come about.

It seemed to me that it was still a distressed and upset Andy Cordier who prepared to leave the United Nations in 1962 despite the inviting future which lay ahead. There was the appointment at Columbia University which would commence officially on July 1st and prior to that he and his wife were to have a round-the-world trip of two months duration as guests of the Ford Foundation. The trip was in recognition of his work at the United Nations but the Foundation was also looking forward to receiving his observations on its assistance programmes abroad. The Cordiers were to leave on 3 April.

During March he devoted considerable time to the setting up of the United States Committee for the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation of Sweden, the latter having been established by the Swedes as a memorial to Dag, using the flow of contributions which had poured in

to the Swedish Government in the wake of Hammarskjold's tragic death. It was planned to use these funds for development programmes for the "Third World", a primary interest of Dag's. Cordier spearheaded the creation of a United States Committee in order to raise additional funds and he brought this fund-raising activity with him to Columbia University. It was a project which in the end was not too successful. I felt it might have been if Cordier personally had been able to do the fund-raising but he had to place it in the hands of others. One reason he himself gave was that US donors wished to have some voice in the disposition of the funds and when they found that this was not to be the case they were not as forthcoming as he had anticipated. Another reason he gave was that "people soon forget" and he said this rather bitterly for he had not changed his mind about Dag Hammarskjold, whom he considered to be one of the great men of his time.

During that last month also he made arrangements for the transfer to Columbia University of all the working papers which I had maintained for him at the United Nations. Not being a writer or an historian, I could not see what purpose they would serve and I said to him "Why do you want all of these papers? There is not always a complete story here?" His reply was brief as usual. He said "Never mind, I just do." He was not about to go into a long explanation, but he had a reason, a long view one;

these papers would be helpful background to him some day in writing about the United Nations which he intended to do. As an historian he placed a value on those papers which I had not.

He seemed anxious to have me join the staff of the School of International Affairs too and offered me a job there but I decided to remain with the United Nations. I still had ten years of service before retirement and there were such favourable financial considerations both as to salary and pension with the international organization that I could not afford to ignore them. Also, rightly or wrongly, I was of the opinion that he needed to separate himself completely from his former staff and the recent unhappy events at the United Nations. I felt that if I went to Columbia University with him he would be discussing and perhaps re-living the past events with me instead of acquiring a fresh outlook. There was in any event a competent staff already on hand at the School and I could not see where I could fit in. ^{For his part} /he may have felt that since I had served as his assistant for twelve years he should at least offer me another post to go to if I wished. On the other hand perhaps he was thinking about that history he eventually intended to write.

After all that had happened I was anxious to leave the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and I requested a field

assignment. I was offered Liberia or Nepal where in each case the United Nations had technical assistance programmes. The memories of the Congo were still so poignant that I did not feel I wanted to go to Africa, so I elected for Nepal. Nepal had struck a more responsive chord/because Hammarskjold had visited there in 1959 and had come away deeply impressed with the country. He later wrote an article about it which was published in the January 1961 issue of the National Geographic. It was entitled "A New Look at Everest." He had taken some worthwhile photographs of Everest and Annapurna and one of these hung on his conference room wall. During the Congo crisis I am told he would once in a while draw an analogy saying it took the same kind of will and determination to scale the high peaks as it did to surmount the problems of the Congo.

The Cordiers left New York as planned on 3 April 1962. I did not say goodbye for I knew I would be seeing them again soon in Nepal. The Ford Foundation had a programme in that country and Kathmandu was on their itinerary. There was another element of interest to Cordier also. Because of Hammarskjold's early interest in Nepal, he thought it might be appropriate if the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation gave some thought to using Nepal as a starting point for their development programmes.

I had only been a few weeks in Nepal when the Cordiers arrived on May 4th. They had just concluded a strenuous schedule with visits to Dublin, Paris, Geneva, Tunis, Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem, Karachi and New Delhi. They had flown to Kathmandu direct from New Delhi and they were to return there for a few days before proceeding to Athens, Rome, Stockholm, Berlin and London. At some point in their trip they were to visit Maseveaux in France, the ancestral home of Cordier's forebears.

In Kathmandu they stayed at the Royal Hotel, made famous by the owner "Boris" who was an expatriate Russian and a legendary figure. Their programme was largely coordinated by the Ford Foundation representative, William Thweatt -- the local United Nations office was not involved officially. Several tours were arranged, one for each of their three day stay. The Thweatts entertained at lunch for them on the first day of their arrival, and again on the evening before their departure. There were two United Nations events -- Professor Merrill Goodall, the public administration expert gave a dinner party for them on Friday evening and on Saturday Andy was invited to address the local United Nations Association. While the audience seemed interested enough in what he had to say, I recall thinking that he appeared tired and lackluster even though his subject was the United Nations. He was no longer part of it and I wondered if this was inhibiting him. However what

I was attributing to some inner conflict could well have been just extreme fatigue as they had no rest at all in Kathmandu.

There was a reception following that meeting given by Rishikesh Shah whom Cordier had become friends with in New York when the latter served as the first Permanent Representative of Nepal to the United Nations. He had been a colourful figure at the United Nations and was related to the royal family. On Sunday the Cordiers were given another tour, this time of the Tibetan Refugee camp. Bill Thweatt's final reception was that evening and the next day, Monday, 7 May the Cordiers returned to New Delhi.

It was a hectic three days but on the whole they seemed pleased with their visit. Dorothy was particularly fascinated with the Tibetan refugee camp and especially with the self-help handicraft centre which had been established by a Swiss technical assistance expert, Tony Hagen and his wife. The Tibetans were making carpets, coats, sweaters and boots in modified versions of Tibetan styles and designs. Cordier and Hagen established a friendly rapport that day and I remember several years later meeting Tony Hagen at a reception given by Cordier in New York on the occasion of the publication of a volume of selected speeches and statements by Hammarskjöld.

During their visit I accompanied the Cordiers on the tours and attended the various functions. There was very little time left to visit with them although we did manage some private chats. The whole situation seemed rather unreal to me. Suddenly Andy Cordier was no longer the "boss", no longer the important United Nations official and this took some getting used to because he had been so identified with it. The Cordiers were in a state of transition and so was I. Theirs was from the United Nations and all its poignant associations to the new and academic world of Columbia University. Mine was to the changed facts of life and the bewildering adjustment to the new cultural environment of Asia and Nepal. It was there in Nepal that we severed the strong United Nations tie and in that sense it was there that I really bid them goodbye for we knew then that it could never be quite the same again. But I was aware that whatever happened we would always be close friends for once a friendship was established with the Cordiers it was an enduring thing.